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Abstract 
The paper assesses how remittances directly and indirectly affect industrialisation in a panel 
of 49 African countries for the period 1980-2014. The indirect impact is assessed through 
financial development channels. The empirical evidence is based on three interactive and 
non-interactive simultaneity-robust estimation techniques, namely: (i) Instrumental Fixed 
Effects (FE) to control for the unobserved heterogeneity; (ii) Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) to control for persistence in industrialisation and (iii) Instrumental Quantile 
Regressions (QR) to account for initial levels of industrialisation. The non-interactive 
specification elucidates direct effects of remittances on industrialisation whereas interactive 
specifications explain indirect impacts. The findings broadly show that for certain initial 
levels of industrialisation, remittances can drive industrialisation through the financial 
development mechanism. Policy implications are discussed.  
 
JEL Classification: F24; F43; F63; G20; O55 
Keywords: Africa; Financial development; Industrialisation; Remittances  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Remittances from abroad are one important source of foreign capital flow to Sub-Sahara 
Africa (SSA). From early 2000, its importance is seen in the volume of its inflow, which has 
increased many folds above foreign aid and very close to the volume of foreign direct 
investment flow (See Figure 1). Among the benefits of remittance over other forms of 
foreign capital flow include its less cyclical and volatile nature; meaning that remittances 
can be more reliable than other sources of foreign capital flow. Little wonder it has become 
the focus of African Development practitioners, especially considering public policies to 
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harness this all important capital flow. In 2013, the Joint African Union-Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) emphasised on the need for African countries to refocus 
attention on leveraging on remittance flow. 
Figure 1: Foreign Investment Flow to Africa 
 
Source: Authors’ Computation from World Development Indicators 
 
Noting the importance of remittance inflow to African countries, this study examines the 
possibility of remittances realising the African industrialisation drive. We also take interest 
in the quality of financial institutions within these countries and how it can play a 
complementary role in realising Africa’s industrialization. It is recognised that most African 
countries are resource-dependent. Their export is majorly-driven by raw materials and 
agricultural commodities, with little economic diversification. Almost the entire SSA 
countries are between 80 – 100 percent dependent on commodity trading as their major 
source of foreign exchange (UNCTAD, 2014). The danger of this scenario include exposure 
of African economies to international shocks caused by commodity price changes, hurting 
governance structure and rent-seeking behaviour caused by over-reliance on primary product 
and greater exposure to the risk of state fragility caused by rebellion from opposing factions 
that want to control the resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001). These possible incidences 
point to the need for increased industrialisation of African countries since it can mitigate the 
negative impact from primary commodity dependence and could increase household 
consumption, the demand for intermediate goods and further change the drivers of economic 
growth (Gui-Diby & Renard, 2015).  
Harnessing Diaspora remittance inflow could be an alternative policy option to improve the 
development of African industrial sector not just because of the monetary volume of the 
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inflow, but because of other technical reasons. For instance, the heightened human capital 
and skills that exist in Diaspora can be an added knowledge capital in line with the financial 
resources from abroad. Since these resources and technical capacities are from the nationals 
of such countries living abroad, then it is possible to expect better indigenization and less 
resistance as experienced in some African countries. Other forms of foreign financial flow 
have been viewed with skepticism because of the claim of self-interest, capital repatriation, 
global volatility that can affect their volume of inflow and its crowd-out effect on smaller 
indigenous businesses (Fortanier, 2007; Moura &  Forte, 2009). For example, following the 
long history of colonialism of African countries, there are sentiments that investments from 
foreign nationals may result in neo-colonialism, exposing the host countries and their 
resources to foreign exploitations. More so, Diasporas may be more willing to invest in 
fragile economies like some of those in Africa unlike foreign investors who may be 
unwilling to risk losing their investments.  
In fact, there are success stories recorded in African countries as a result of Diaspora 
investment. Examples are the Dahabshiil story of Somalia Diaspora is an important 
evidence of African Diaspora which thrives rapidly despite state collapse as in Somalia in 
1988. In Nigeria, some organizations such as Nigeria in Diaspora Support Programme, the 
Annual Diaspora Direct Investment Summit and the Nigerian Diaspora Trade and 
Investment Association are success stories on how the Diaspora can contribute to industrial 
growth and development. Nonetheless, though Diaspora financial inflow may not be 
expected to have a huge industrial push in Africa, it can help provide a stable economic 
foundation on which sustainable industrial development can be fostered. To this end, the 
impact of Diaspora remittance inflow on industrialization is analyzed with panel data from 
49 African countries for the period 1980 to 2015. We ask two important questions: first, to 
what extent will Diaspora remittance inflow affect Africa’s industrialization drive? Second, 
will this effect be dependent on the quality of the financial institutions in the respective 
countries? There is a lack of econometric studies that have considered this relationship with 
a focus on Africa; this paper therefore intends to fill this observed gap. This objective is 
important considering the rising trend of remittance inflow to Africa and the rising policy 
interest on how to efficiently maximize this huge economic resource. Thus, it would be 
worth having a critical view on their impact, which would be helpful in setting a direction 
for new generation policies on for African development.  
5 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the second section contains a brief 
literature review that explains how remittance inflow can induce industrialization. The third 
section presents the stylized facts on remittance inflow and industrialization in Africa, while 
the fourth section presents the research method which contains an overview of the data used 
and addresses econometric issues stemming from the data analysis. The fifth section 
presents the empirical results and their interpretation. The conclusion and summary of 
results are included in the sixth section. 
 
2. Literature review 
Industrialisation is defined as a socio-economic process of rapid transformation in 
significant manufacturing activity in relation to other forms of production and work 
undertaken within a respective economy (Naude, Szirmai and Lavopa, 2013). It entails the 
increase in value addition of the manufacturing sector in relation to the overall size of the 
economy. This entails that a significant development of the manufacturing sector, compared 
with other sectors, will lead to a faster attainment of any country’s industrialisation (Gui-
Diby & Renard, 2015). From these definitions, two components are required for 
industrialisation to thrive. They include the encouragement of the manufacturing sector for 
production and such production must be sustained in order to meet local and international 
demands.  
On the other hand, remittances, being the financial counterpart of migration, are largely seen 
as household transfer with altruism motives and have a social insurance role (Agarwal and 
Horowitz, 2002; Kapur, 2004). However, there are more benefits from remittances than just 
the household benefit. For instance, considering industrialisation of nations, remittance 
inflow can be of immense benefit through direct and indirect impacts. There is a rich 
literature that documents a more active utilisation of capital flow from remittances rather 
than final demand expenditure. More importantly, as a source of liquidity, remittances can 
boost domestic entrepreneurship. Furthermore, remittances act as a substitute for inefficient 
or non-existent credit markets in order to enable local entrepreneurs bypass the barriers to 
business development that results from lack of start-up capital or high interest rates. 
Woodruff and Zentano (2001) found that 27% of firms in Mexico were reliant on 
remittances from abroad to finance their liquidity and that remittances represent 20% of the 
capital invested for business development.  
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Massey and Parrado (1998), earlier, concluded that start-up capital for 21 percent of 
businesses in Mexico required remittances from working in the USA. Woodruff and Zenteno 
(2007) also associated Mexican enterprise growth and expansion to international migration 
(Mexico-to-US). Yang (2008) estimates the responses of Filipino households to positive 
economic shocks in the destination country of migrated household members; these shocks 
increased the levels of investment in entrepreneurship. In a recent study by Hossain and 
Hasanuzzaman (2015) on the relevance of remittances to Bangladesh’s economy, the authors 
found a positive long-run effect of remittance inflow on investment. These studies show that 
remittances can improve entrepreneurship and investment in enterprise and an accumulation 
of these value addition activities will most likely result in industrialisation. 
Another direct channel through which remittance inflow promotes industrialisation is skill 
and technology transfer, and improved market-oriented production. Brinkerhoff (2006) 
presents an explicit analysis of how migrants promote skill transfer within the homelands of 
Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Philippines, and Afghanistan. Syed and Miyazako (2013) 
found remittance to be an important source of investment in agriculture particularly for a 
shift from subsistence agriculture to market-oriented production. Likewise in Ghana, 
remittance is seen to improve both farm and non-farm production (Tsegai, 2004). This 
important role of remittance is vital for African countries as there is a policy debate on how 
to improve the agricultural sector from subsistence and primary production to value 
addition. Traditionally, lack of access to fundamental assets and productive inputs like 
credit, has prevented the capitalisation of agricultural enterprises and productivity in 
developing countries. Apart from the agricultural sector, Dzansi (2013) uses manufacturing 
data on a sample of 40 remittance-dependent economies over the period 1991 to 2004 to 
conclude that remittance inflow accelerates manufacturing growth. The evidence is robust to 
industry and year-specific effects. One important channel through which remittance inflow 
affects productivity is skill and technology transfers that migrants bring to their home 
countries. Barajas et al (2009) noted that remittance may affect Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) growth by changing the size of dynamic production externalities generated by an 
economy. Moreover, remittances have also been recently documented to contribute to output 
per worker (Ssozi & Asongu, 2016a) and TFP (Ssozi & Asongu, 2016b) in SSA.  
An indirect channel through which remittances inflow affect industrialisation is the 
exchange rate, which will definitely affect the manufacturing sector’s performance. 
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Remittance inflow can affect the relative growth of traded and non-traded manufacturing 
sectors. Its impact on the traded manufacturing sector is principally affected by its role on 
the country’s real exchange rate (Rajan & Subramanian, 2005; Selaya & Thiele, 2010). 
Since remittances affect the exchange rate of countries as a result of the demand for and 
supply of foreign exchange, the value of tradable manufacturing goods will most likely be 
affected, which will in turn influences the performance of the manufacturing sector.  
The extent to which remittance affects the manufacturing sector through real exchange rate 
changes is largely dependent on the extent to which the nature of traded-goods production is 
likely to generate dynamic production externalities (Barajas et al., 2009). Dzansi (2013) 
supports this argument using a sample of 40 countries for the period 1991-2004. The author 
finds that remittance inflow promotes the relative growth of traded manufacturing sectors in 
recipient countries. On the contrary, Acosta, Lartey and Mandelman (2009) found that a 
massive inflow of foreign currency could be associated with a real exchange rate 
appreciation and subsequently a loss of international competitiveness. This in turn could 
lead to a decline in the production of manufactured and other tradable goods. Remittances 
can also affect the domestic manufacturing sector through the increase in demand for non-
tradable goods. Since remittance inflow raises consumption of household (Amuedo-
Dorantes, 2014), the demand for non-tradable will also be on the increase and will affect the 
productive performance of this sector. Lartey et al. (2008) showed this relationship by using 
a sample of 109 developing and transition countries for the period 1990-2003. Their study 
found a relative positive impact of remittance inflow on the prices of non-tradable compared 
to tradable.  
Remittance also has an indirect impact on the growth of the manufacturing sector and 
industrialisation through its impact on financial development. The development of the 
financial system means that financial institutions are efficient in performing their 
responsibility of transforming mobilised deposits into credit for economic operators within 
an economy. Thus, for a financial system to be efficient there must be credit flowing more or 
less from the financial system to the real economy through the pooling of savings and 
allocation of capital to productive investments, among others (Levine, 2005; Estrada et al., 
2010; Svirydzenka, 2016). In the long-run, the efficiency of the financial system can lead to 
the growth of the manufacturing sector and industrial development (Shahbaz & Lean, 2012; 
Udoh & Ogbuagu, 2012; Ewetan & Ike, 2014). Remittances are also seen as an important 
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source of savings and bank deposit to the financial sector in recipient countries. Aggarwal, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Peria (2011) using 99 developing countries found evidence that 
remittances contribute to increasing the aggregate level of deposits and credit intermediated 
by the local banking sector. In Uganda, Kaberuka and Namubiru (2014) found a positive 
effect, while Karikari, Mensah and Harvey (2016) also found a positive effect for the entire 
Africa. 
From the literature reviewed, there are different channels through which remittances can 
affect industrialisation; either directly or indirectly. No matter the channel, some negative 
externalities can be observed especially with regards to the impact of remittance inflow on 
the foreign exchange appreciation and the diversion of labour supply from the productive 
manufacturing sector. Acosta, Lartey and Mandelman (2009) clearly illustrate this 
phenomenon for El Salvador. However, maximising the positive impact of remittances and 
translating it to industrial growth will depend on some factors. For instance, the government 
will be involved in policies oriented towards maximising the gains from migration, firms can 
be involved in backward integration of domestic enterprises that may have migrant input, 
and the household/individuals can be involved in skill and capacity development. Most 
important of these factors is the government’s intervention in maximising the gains from 
migration.  
Taking a cue from Chinese industrial growth and the relevance of migrant input, it is evident 
that the active participation of the government and its dynamic policies targeted at 
encouraging migrant input to the economy had a great impact on Chinese industrial 
development (Xiang, 2006). Most importantly, the government creates policies that define 
the rule of the game and creates incentives to encourage economic interactions. Some of 
these policies can be directed at improving the quality of the financial institutions in the 
respective countries. The role of financial institution in the relationship between remittance 
and industrialisation is entirely supportive. This implies that despite the volume of 
remittance inflow, the role of financial institutions in supporting investments and business 
development cannot be neglected. This is based on the wisdom of some studies that have 
shown a complementary relationship between remittance and financial development (e.g. 
Osabuohien and Efobi, 2012; Bettin et al, 2012; Efobi et al, 2014). These studies points out 
that in countries with high remittance inflow and improved financial institutions, remittance 
recipient can better utilise the fund for investment and business development. However, in 
9 
 
relation to industrialisation, we could not locate any empirical study that has tested this 
relationship.  
 
3. Stylized facts on remittance and industrialisation in Africa 
As earlier noted, the level of industrialisation in Africa is low compared to other regions of 
the world. The annual growth rate of the industrial sector which was less than 2 percent for 
the period 2000-02 and about 5 percent for 2003-05, has consistently declined after this 
period (See Figure 1a). Overall, the annual industry growth rate was not more than 5 percent 
for the entire period of 1991 to 2015. Apart from countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, countries in other regions like East Asia and Pacific, and Europe and Central Asia 
(for some period) witnessed a growth rate that is higher than that of SSA countries. The trend 
in Africa’s industrial development is also reflected in the performance of tradable export. 
Figure 1b shows the trend of manufacturing export to total export for African countries in 
comparison to countries of other regions of the world. From the Figure, the manufacturing 
export performance for SSA countries is lower than those of other countries from other 
regions for the entire period. The highest volume of manufacturing export was 30 percent 
only for the period 2003-05. After then, a downward slope is observed.  
 
Figure 1a: Industry, value added (annual % growth) 
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Figure 1b: % of Manufacturing export contribution to total export 
 
We further consider the growth rate of GDP per capita by sector in order to understand the 
growth rate by sectors and to compare that of the manufacturing sector with other sectors of 
African countries. This trend is presented in Figure 2; evidently, the manufacturing sector has 
long performed below other sectors in terms of their growth rate. On the average, the growth 
rate of manufacturing GDP per capita has remained less than 1.26 percent per year, which is 
lower than those of the extractive and service sectors. The low growth rate of the industrial 
sector in SSA countries is largely traceable to poor investment climate; infrastructure and 
skills, inter alia (see Page, 2012). More so, severe lack of local capital available to fund 
industrialisation and value added production is another challenge that explains low 
performance of the industrial sector in Africa. 
Figure 2: Growth in GDP Per Capita by Sector (SSA Countries) 
 
Source: Recomputed from Ferreira (2014). 
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Noting the several factors responsible for the slow growth of the industrial sector in Africa, 
lack of capital and technical resources are important inputs that can spur rapid growth in 
manufacturing (Gui-Diby & Renard, 2015). Apart from foreign investment, remittance is 
seen as an essential capital inflow that can have both direct and indirect effects on the volume 
of industrial development in Africa. Noting this, we then examine the trend of workers’ 
remittances into SSA and then compare it with those of other countries from other regions. In 
Figure 3, the extent to which remittance inflow matters to the economies of SSA is 
consistently high, with volumes that are many folds more than those of Europe, Central Asia 
and, East Asia and the Pacific. On the average and since 2000, remittance inflow to countries 
in SSA is higher than the 1.5 percent of the total GDP. Remittance inflow for countries in 
East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia never reached this threshold for the entire 
period displayed in Figure 3. For Latin America and the Caribbean, they only reached this 
threshold during the period 2000-09 and afterwards, the remittance inflow remained lower 
than 1.5 percent.  
 
Figure 3: Remittance Inflow as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Computed from World Development Indicators (2016). 
 
The importance of remittance in the industrialisation of African countries is seen in the 
preliminary scatter plot presented in Figure 4. The scatter plot involves some sample 
countries in SSA, where industrialisation is captured using the manufacturing value added as 
a percentage of GDP as applied by Gui-Diby and Renard (2015) and remittance is measured 
as personal remittances received as a percentage of GDP. From the Figure, it is evident that 
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positive relationships exist between remittances and industrialisation in the selected African 
countries. For each of these countries, remittance inflow results in an upward shift of the 
volume of value addition in the manufacturing sector. This relationship suggests that the 
argument that African countries may benefit from remittances in their drive to ensure the 
growth rate of the industrial sector is feasible and not overboard. Though this relationship is 
preliminary, we intend to empirically test it using more sophisticated econometric techniques 
that take care of endogeneity and simultaneity issues.  This will be elaborated further in 
subsequent sections. 
 
Figure 4: Scatter Plot (Remittance and Industrialisation in Africa – 1980-2015) 
 
Source: Authors’ Computation 
 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1 Data  
This study assesses a panel of 49 African countries with data for the period 1980-2014 from 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank and the United Nations Conference 
for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database. Whereas the periodicity for Fixed Effects 
and Quantile regressions is annual for a 35 years span. The adopted periodicity for the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is based on 5 year data averages or non-
overlapping intervals in order to mitigate potential concerns of instrument proliferation or 
over-identification. Hence, there are seven data points used in the GMM specification, 
notably: 1980-1984; 1985-1989; 1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2004; 2005-2009 and 2010-
2014.  
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Our explained variable is industrialization in Africa, which is measured as the manufacturing 
value added as a percentage of GDP (constant prices). We prefer the manufacturing value 
added based on International Standard Industrial Classification (section D). This measure 
captures the productive manufacturing units that are classified according to the kind of 
principal economic activity, which include works that are performed by power-driven 
machinery or manually, factory based work or in a household (United Nations, 1990). Also, 
this measure of industrialisation is favoured by Kang and Lee (2011), UNIDO (2013) and 
Gui-Diby and Renard (2015).   
Two main independent variables are employed: (i) personal remittances received (as % of 
GDP) and (ii) financial sector development in terms of bank sector intermediation efficiency 
and domestic credit to the private sector. Whereas remittance is the main focus of the paper, 
financial development is used as a channel via which via remittances can influence 
industrialization. This is consistent with the objective of the study which is to assess the 
direct and indirect incidences of remittances on industrialization.  
The choice of the financial development channels is motivated by the fact that while 
investment is needed for industrialization, such investment for the most part has to be 
financed by the banking sector, since financial markets are not developed in most African 
countries (see Asongu, 2012, 2013a). Accordingly, we argue that even when remittances are 
used for consumption purposes, they may still be deposited in financial institutions for other 
investment and/or future consumption purposes. Such corresponding mobilized deposits or 
liquidity liabilities in financial institutions are then borrowed to economic operators for 
investment purposes. In the light of these clarifications: (i) banking intermediation efficiency 
measures the ability of financial institutions to transformed mobilized deposits into credit for 
economic operators while (ii) domestic credit to the private sector is a measurement of 
financial activity or the ability of financial institutions to grant credit to economic operators. 
In order to account for omitted variable bias in the regressions, five control variables are 
employed, namely: trade openness, domestic investment, internet penetration, population 
growth and economic globalization. While from intuition positive effects can be expected 
from all the control variables on industrialization, market dynamics and expansion could 
reveal different effects. For instance, domestic investment that is skewed toward social, 
education and health investment may not directly lead to industrialization or may even slow-
down the process.  On the other hand, domestic investment to the productive sector directly 
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affects industrialization. With regard to population growth, if commodities demanded by an 
increasing population are imported for the most part, this may not engender negative effects 
on domestic industrialization.  
The definitions of the variables (with the corresponding sources) are provided in Appendix 1, 
while the summary statistics in disclosed in Appendix 2. Two sets of correlation matrices are 
provided in Appendix 3:  one on instrumented variables for the Fixed Effects and Quantile 
regressions and the other on variables that are not instrumented for the GMM regressions.  
4.2 Methodology 
 
4.2.1 Instrumentation and instrumental Fixed effects estimations   
 
Three simultaneity-robust estimation techniques are employed, namely: (i) Instrumental 
Variable (IV)
1
 Fixed Effects to control for the unobserved heterogeneity; (ii) Generalised 
Method of Moments to control for persistence in industrialisation and (ii) IV Variable 
Quantile regressions to account for initial levels of industrialisation. The employment of 
multiple estimation techniques is in accordance with data behaviour (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016a).  
The issue of simultaneity (or an aspect of endogeneity) in the independent variables is tackled 
by instrumenting them with their first lags. For instance, the procedure for instrumenting 
remittances is as follows in Eq. (1) below. 
  titijti ,1,, ReRe      ,                                                                                              (1) 
where ti ,Re , denotes remittances of  country i  
at  period t ,    is a constant, 1,Re ti , 
represents  remittances in country i
 
at  period 1t , and ti ,  the error term.  
The instrumentation procedure in Eq. (1) consists of regressing remittances on their first lags, 
then saving the fitted values that are later used as the independent variable of interest in the 
Fixed Effects and Quantile Regression specifications. The instrumentation process which is 
replicated for all independent variables is Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
(HAC) in standard errors. 
 The panel Fixed Effects (FE) models are presented in Eq. (2) as follows: 
 
tiitih
h
htitititi WFinFinI ,,,
5
1
,3,2,10, ReRe    

  ,                                     (2)                                                   
                                                          
1
 Instrumental Variable and Instrumental are used interchangeably throughout the study.   
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where, tiI ,  
is the industrialization indicator of country i
 
at  period t ,  is a constant,
 
Re  is 
remittances, Fin  represents financial development (financial efficiency or financial activity), 
FinRe is the interaction between remittances and financial development, 
 
W  is the vector of 
control variables (trade openness, domestic investment, internet penetration, population 
growth and economic globalization),
 i

 
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 
4.2.2 Generalised method of moments: specification, identification and exclusion restrictions 
  
There are five main reasons for adopting a GMM technique. First, the N>T (49>7) criterion 
that is essential for the application of the estimation approach is met given that the number of 
countries  (or cross sections) is substantially higher than the number of data points used for 
the GMM specification. It is important to noted, we are using 5 year non-overlapping 
intervals for the GMM specification. Second, industrialisation is persistent because its 
correlation with its first lag is 0.968 which is higher than the 0.800 rule of thumb threshold. 
Third, given that the GMM specification is consistent with panel data analysis; cross-country 
differences are considered in the regressions. Fourth, the system estimator corrects for biases 
in the difference estimator. Fifth, the estimation approach has some bite on endogeneity 
because it accounts for simultaneity. Moreover, the use of time-invariant omitted variables    
also increases the control for endogeneity.  
Consistent with Bond et al. (2001), the system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) has better estimation properties when compared 
with the difference estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). In this study, we prefer 
the Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) because it has been 
documented to:  (i) restrict over-identification or instrument proliferation and (ii) account for 
cross-sectional dependence (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Boateng et al., 2016). 
Accordingly, the technique adopts forward orthogonal deviations instead of first differences. 
The adopted specification approach is two-step because it controls for heteroscedasticity. It is 
important to note that the one-step approach is homoscedasticity-consistent.   
The following equations in level (3) and first difference (4) summarize the standard system 
GMM estimation procedure.  
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where,  represents the coefficient of auto-regression and t  
is the time-specific constant.   
 
We briefly discussed exclusion and identification restrictions. As documented in recent 
literature, all explanatory variables are considered  as predetermined or suspected endogenous 
while only time-invariant omitted variables are acknowledged as strictly exogenous (see 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a; Boateng et al., 2016). This is because it is unfeasible for 
time-invariant omitted variables (or years) to become endogenous in first-difference (see 
Roodman, 2009b). Hence, the process for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ while 
the gmmstyle is used for predetermined variables.  
In the light of above insights, years or time invariant omitted variables influence 
industrialisation exclusively through the suspected endogenous variables. Furthermore, the 
statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is examined with the Difference in Hansen Test 
(DHT) for instrument exogeneity. Accordingly, the alternative hypothesis of this test should 
be rejected for the time-invariant omitted variables to elucidate industrialisation exclusively 
via the endogenous explaining variables. Therefore, whereas in the standard instrumental 
variable (IV) approach, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying 
Restrictions (OIR) test shows that the instruments do not elucidate the outcome variable 
beyond the predetermined variables (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b), 
with the GMM technique, the information criterion needed to examine if time-invariant 
omitted variables are strictly exogenous is the DHT. Hence, in the findings that are revealed 
in Section 5, this assumption of exclusion restriction is confirmed if the null hypothesis of the 
DHT corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is not rejected. 
 
4.2.3 Instrumental Quantile regressions 
The preceding modelling approaches are based on mean values of the industrialisation. 
Unfortunately, mean values reflect blanket policies. Furthermore, such blanket policies may 
not be effective unless they are contingent on existing levels of industrialisation and specified 
differently across countries with high, intermediate and low industrialisation. The concern 
about modelling exclusively at the conditional mean of the dependent variable is addressed 
with Quantile Regressions (QR) which enables the study to assess the relationships 
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throughout the conditional distributions of industrialisation (see Keonker & Hallock, 2001; 
Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013b).  
Knowledgeable of above facts, studies that assess mean impacts with Ordinary Least Squares 
are founded on the hypothesis of normally distributed error terms. Such an assumption of 
normally distributed errors terms is not valid in the QR technique. Moreover, the estimation 
approach is robust in the presence of outliers because it enables the examination of parameter 
estimates at various points of the conditional distribution of the outcome variable (or 
industrialisation) (see Koenker & Bassett, 1978).   
The  th quintile estimator of industralisation is obtained by solving the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (5) 
   
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xyxy
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)1(min
 ,                                                      (5) 
where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
instance, the 10
th
 or 90
th
 quintiles (with  =0.10 or 0.90 respectively) are investigated by 
approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of industrialisation or iy given 
ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(  ,                                                                                                              (6) 
Where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are assessed only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of the industrialisation. In Eq. (6), the dependent variable 
iy  is industrialisation  whereas ix  contains a constant term, remittances, financial 
development, interaction between remittances and financial development, trade openness, 
domestic investment, internet penetration, population growth and economic globalization. 
Given that all independent variables are instrumented, the OLS in the QR approach become a 
Two Stage Least Squares exercise.  
 
5. Presentation of results  
While Table 1 presents findings on FE and GMM regressions, Table 2 discloses results on 
QR. Both models entail 3 specifications: the non-interactive specification and two 
interactive specifications. One of the interactive specifications corresponds to banking 
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efficiency, while the other is related to financial activity. The non-interactive specification 
elucidates direct effects of remittances on industrialisation, whereas interactive 
specifications explain indirect impacts. In the same vein, Table 2 presents three 
specifications, one corresponding to non-interactive regressions for direct effects (see Panel 
A) and the other two related to interactive regressions for indirect impacts (Panels B and C). 
From the FE regressions in Table 1, there is a negative marginal effect from the interaction 
between domestic credit and remittances. In the same table, four principal information 
criteria are employed to assess the validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal 
deviations
2
. Not all control variables are included in the GMM specification in order to 
avoid instrument proliferation that could substantially bias estimated coefficients.  Based on 
the information criteria, a positive marginal effect is apparent from the interaction between 
remittances and banking system efficiency.  
The following findings are apparent from the QR in Table 2. Consistent differences in 
estimated coefficients between Two Stage Least Squares and quintiles (in terms of sign, 
significance and magnitude of significance) justify the relevance of adopted empirical 
strategy. In Panel A, banking efficiency decreases industrialisation whereas domestic credit 
increases it. In Panel B, the interaction between remittances and banking efficiency is 
positive in the 0.50
th
 and 0.75
th
 quintiles while it is negative in the 0.90
th
 quintile. In Panel C, 
the interaction between remittances and domestic credit is positive from the 0.10
th
 to the 
0.50
th
 quintiles and the 0.90
th
 quintile while it is negative in the 0.75
th
 quintile. Most of the 
significant control variables have the expected signs.  
The findings broadly show that for certain initial levels of industrialisation, remittances can 
drive industrialisation through financial development mechanisms. The direct negative effect 
of bank efficiency may be traceable to the substantially documented issues of surplus 
liquidity in African financial institutions (see Saxegaard, 2006; Asongu, 2014). This 
scenario will certainly need to be addressed to expect a positive and significant 
complementary impact from remittance inflow on industrialisation. This also explains why 
                                                          
2 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, 
we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR 
test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2016, p.9). 
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the interaction of remittances with private domestic credit has more positive effects 
throughout the conditional distributions of industrialisation. Moreover, the positive marginal 
effects with private domestic credit are also of higher magnitude. To put this point into 
greater perspective, when remittances are deposited in financial institutions as liquid 
liabilities, such deposits have to be transformed into credit for economic operators in order 
to affect the industrialisation process. Unfortunately, the substantially documented issue of 
surplus liquidity is partly confirmed in this inquiry because the banking system efficiency 
variable does not consistently interact with remittances to affect industrialisation. It is 
important to note that banking system efficiency or financial intermediation efficiency is 
appreciated as the ability of banks to transform mobilised deposits into credit for economic 
operators. 
In the light of the above, remittances should be accompanied with complementary financial 
development policies that have an overall aim of fighting concerns of surplus liquidity. The 
introduction of information sharing offices that are destined to mitigate information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers is an important step towards this direction. These 
recommendations are consistent with the perspective that remittances are more effective 
when a policy environment is good for investment with sound institutions and well 
developed financial systems (see IMF, 2005). This is also in accordance with recent research 
which shows that remittances could promote financial development which in turn promotes 
economic prosperity (Aggarwal et al., 2011). Even in scenarios where financial systems are 
undeveloped, remittances could directly affect economic development (Giuliano & Ruiz-
Arranz, 2009). 
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Table 1: Fixed Effects and GMM Interactive and Non-Interactive Regressions  
 Dependent variable: Industrialisation  
 Fixed Effects GMM (Based on 5 Yr NOI) 
Industrialisation(-1) --- --- ---  0.960*** 0.895*** 0.887*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 16.243*** 15.946*** 15.138*** Constant 2.898** 1.403 0.043 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.023) (0.297) (0.960) 
Remit(IV) -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0005 Remit 0.073*** -0.031 0.097** 
 (0.170) (0.567) (0.379)  (0.000) (0.192) (0.043) 
BcBd(IV) -0.007** -0.009** --- BE -0.002 -0.017 --- 
 (0.022) (0.023)   (0.768) (0.112)  
Domcred(IV) -0.015 --- -0.012 DC -0.009 --- 0.003 
 (0.206)  (0.380)  (0.414)  (0.905) 
Remit(IV)×BcBd(IV) --- 0.001 --- Remi×BcBd --- 0.001** --- 
  (0.984)    (0.020)  
Remit(IV)×Domcred(IV) --- --- -0.005** Remit×Domcred --- --- -0.004 
   (0.018)    (0.134) 
Trade (IV) 0.001 0.001 0.0006 Trade  -0.016** 0.006  
 (0.898) (0.818) (0.936)  (0.039) (0.291)  
GFCF(IV) -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.102*** GFCF 0.009 -0.024 0.011 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.674) (0.133) (0.112) 
Internet(IV) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** Internet --- --- --- 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.008)     
Population(IV) -0.027 -0.024 -0.023 Population --- --- --- 
 (0.137) (0.181) (0.194)     
Ecoglob(IV) -0.002 -0.003 0.008 Ecoglob --- --- --- 
 (0.902) (0.857) (0.659)     
        
    AR(1) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
    AR(2) (0.188) (0.148) (0.254) 
    Sargan OIR (0.219) (0.029) (0.068) 
    Hansen OIR (0.732) (0.281) (0.811) 
        
    DHT for 
instruments 
   
    (a)Instruments in 
levels 
   
    H excluding 
group 
(0.513) (0.472) (0.531) 
    Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.710) (0.222) (0.812) 
    (b) IV (years, 
eq(diff)) 
   
    H excluding 
group 
(0.546) (0.354) (0.563) 
    Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.801) (0.250) (0.931) 
        
R²(within) 0.056 0.052 0.061     
Fisher 8.78*** 8.31*** 9.70*** Fisher 135.04*** 267.82*** 146.46*** 
    Instruments  28 28 28 
Countries 43 43 43 Countries 49 47 47 
Observations  1219 1241 1227 Observations  233 212 212 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients and  the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; 
b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR and DHT  tests.  
IV: Instrumented value. Remit: Remittances. BcBd: Bank Credit to Bank Deposits. Domcred: Domestic credit to the private sector. GFCF: 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Pop: Population. Ecoglob: Economic Globalisation. Industria: Industralisation.   
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Table 2: Instrumental Quantile Interactive and Non-Interactive Regressions  
 Dependent variable: Industrialisation 
 Panel A: Non-Interactive Regressions 
 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  13.727*** 4.921*** 7.962*** 14.810*** 21.484*** 21.946*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Remit(IV) 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0007* -0.0005 -0.00007 
 (0.358) (0.359) (0.302) (0.078) (0.352) (0.942) 
BcBd(IV) -0.018*** -0.001 -0.008*** -0.023*** -0.036*** -0.043*** 
 (0.000) (0.754) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domcred(IV) 0.158*** 0.142*** 0.162*** 0.211*** 0.172*** 0.135*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade (IV) 0.038*** 0.018*** 0.025*** -0.0002 0.037*** 0.044*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.975) (0.001) (0.005) 
GFCF(IV) -0.210*** -0.057** -0.107*** -0.120*** -0.269*** -0.303*** 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet(IV) -0.00009 0.0008 0.0009* 0.001* -0.003*** -0.005*** 
 (0.921) (0.233) (0.086) (0.091) (0.001) (0.006) 
Population(IV) -0.044*** -0.007 -0.016*** -0.038*** -0.064*** -0.106*** 
 (0.000) (0.375) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ecoglob(IV) -0.017 -0.042** -0.051*** -0.060*** -0.021 0.132*** 
 (0.426) (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.349) (0.000) 
       
R²/Pseudo R² 0.175 0.090 0.116 0.140 0.129 0.139 
Fisher  47.34***      
Observations  1219 1219 1219 1219 1219 1219 
       
       
 Panel B: Interactive Regressions with Bank Efficiency 
 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  11.749*** 5.010*** 6.425*** 12.046*** 17.908*** 18.946*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Remit(IV) 0.0003 0.0001 0.001* -0.001* -0.003** 0.002 
 (0.785) (0.893) (0.076) (0.050) (0.026) (0.222) 
BcBd(IV) -0.003 0.013** 0.011** -0.002 -0.027*** -0.025** 
 (0.466) (0.015) (0.022) (0.671) (0.002) (0.023) 
Remit(IV) ×BcBd(IV) 0.00001 -0.0000005 -0.0000005 0.00004*** 0.00004*** -0.00001 
 (0.181) (0.637) (0.517) (0.000) (0.002) (0.372) 
Trade (IV) 0.033*** -0.008 0.004 0.003 0.044*** 0.057*** 
 (0.000) (0.193) (0.522) (0.682) (0.001) (0.000) 
GFCF(IV) -0.166*** 0.025 -0.028 -0.092*** -0.278*** -0.251*** 
 (0.000) (0.255) (0.112) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet(IV) 0.0004 0.0004 0.001** 0.002*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (0.674) (0.521) (0.016) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Population(IV) -0.041*** -0.007 -0.023*** -0.056*** -0.038*** -0.079*** 
 (0.000) (0.356) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ecoglob(IV) 0.042* -0.011 -0.009 0.004 0.110*** 0.182*** 
 (0.050) (0.505) (0.574) (0.809) (0.000) (0.000) 
R²/Pseudo R² 0.084 0.023 0.029 0.047 0.058 0.126 
Fisher  11.92***      
Observations  1241 1241 1241 1241 1241 1241 
       
 Panel C: Interactive Regressions with Domestic Credit to the Private Sector 
 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  12.429*** 7.900*** 9.153*** 13.592*** 15.548*** 17.486*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Remit(IV) -0.0004 -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.0008 -0.001 
 (0.573) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.284) (0.395) 
Domcred(IV) 0.093*** 0.034** 0.080*** 0.088*** 0.188*** 0.060** 
 (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) 
Remit(IV)×Domcred(IV) 0.00006*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.00008*** -0.00006*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) 
Trade (IV) 0.037*** 0.017*** 0.013** 0.0007 0.034*** 0.041*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.929) (0.001) (0.001) 
GFCF(IV) -0.205*** -0.046** -0.076*** -0.092*** -0.254*** -0.350*** 
 (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet(IV) 0.0003 0.001*** 0.001** 0.002*** -0.002** -0.006*** 
22 
 
 (0.682) (0.007) (0.041) (0.003) (0.010) (0.000) 
Population(IV) -0.038*** -0.010 -0.013* -0.036*** -0.061*** -0.092*** 
 (0.000) (0.136) (0.087) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ecoglob(IV) -0.005 -0.075*** -0.058*** -0.064*** 0.031 0.211*** 
 (0.797) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.122) (0.000) 
       
R²/Pseudo R² 0.167 0.138 0.139 0.135 0.104 0.124 
Fisher  61.38***      
Observations  1227 1227 1227 1227 1227 1227 
       
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented value. Remit: Remittances. BcBd: Bank 
Credit to Bank Deposits. Domcred: Domestic credit to the private sector. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Ecoglob: 
Economic Globalisation. Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where industrialisation  is least. 2SLS: Two Stage 
Least Squares.  
 
6. Conclusion and future research directions  
The paper assesses how remittances directly and indirectly affect industrialisation in a panel 
of 49 African countries for the period 1980-2014. The indirect impact is assessed through 
financial development channels. The empirical evidence is based on three interactive and 
non-interactive simultaneity-robust estimation techniques, namely: (i) Instrumental Fixed 
Effects (FE) to control for the unobserved heterogeneity; (ii) Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) to control for persistence in industrialisation and (iii) Instrumental Quantile 
Regressions (QR) to account for initial levels of industrialisation.  
The non-interactive specification elucidates direct effects of remittances on industrialisation 
whereas interactive specifications explain indirect impacts. From the FE, there is a negative 
marginal effect from the interaction between domestic credit and remittances. In the GMM 
results, a positive marginal effect is apparent from the interaction between remittances and 
banking system efficiency. In QR: (i) banking efficiency decreases industrialisation whereas 
domestic credit increases it; (ii) the interaction between remittances and banking efficiency is 
positive in the 0.50
th
 and 0.75
th
 quintiles while it is negative in the 0.90
th
 quintile; (iii) the 
interaction between remittances and domestic credit is positive from the 0.10
th
 to the 0.50
th
 
quintiles and in the 0.90
th
 quintile while it is negative in the 0.75
th
 quintile.  
Considering the importance of remittance inflow as a source of stable foreign capital for the 
improvement of developing countries’ productive capacity and business development, it is 
important to access other possible channels through which remittance affects 
industrialisation. This area of enquiry is important to improve the extant literature, especially 
in relation to African countries.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurement) Sources 
    
Industralisation  Industria Manufacturing (ISIC D) UNCTAD  
    
Remittances  Remit Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Bank Efficiency BcBd Bank credit to bank deposits (%) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Domestic Credit Domcred Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade  Trade Exports and Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Domestic 
Investment  
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation (including Acquisitions less 
disposals of valuables) (% of GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Internet  Internet Internet users (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population  Pop Population (in millions) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Globalisation  Ecoglob Economic globalization World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (1980-2014) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
 Panel A: With Un-instrumented Variables 
  
Industrialisation  11.035 6.692 0.031 38.277 1677 
Remittances  498.55 415.73 1.000 1293.0 1715 
Bank Efficiency  83.193 49.721 8.043 397.115 1581 
Domestic Credit 18.434 15.504 0.198 108.069 1557 
Trade Openness  69.926 38.948 0.000 263.877 1715 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation  21.082 10.901 1.356 107.846 1677 
Internet Penetration 210.67 261.98 1.000 828.00 1715 
Population  14.618 22.056 0.066 177.476 1715 
Economic Globalisation  39.653 13.926 9.193 84.685 1409 
      
      
 Panel B: With Instrumented Variables 
      
Industrialisation  11.035 6.692 0.031 38.277 1677 
Remittances (IV) 501.187 406.236 16.395 1280.314 1666 
Bank Efficiency (IV) 82.078 45.236 13.263 368.191 1528 
Domestic Credit (IV) 18.467 15.064 0.770 106.684 1499 
Trade Openness (IV) 70.039 37.348 3.441 255.733 1666 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (IV) 21.084 9.653 3.729 97.995 1628 
Internet Penetration (IV) 216.831 230.654 35.874 768.000 1666 
Population (IV) 14.786 22.244 0.076 177.335 1666 
Economic Globalisation (IV) 39.867 13.577 10.303 84.298 1366 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.  IV: Instrumental Variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix  
          
Panel A: With Un-instrumented Variables (Uniform sample: 1268 )  
          
Remit BcBd Domcred Trade GFCF Internet Pop Ecoglob Industria  
1.000 -0.001 0.198 -0.013 -0.057 0.417 0.097 0.073 0.097 Remit 
 1.000 0.316 -0.078 -0.070 -0.192 -0.140 -0.192 0.019 BcBd 
  1.000 0.215 0.222 0.135 0.024 0.298 0.288 Domcred 
   1.000 0.569 0.057 -0.234 0.716 0.131 Trade 
    1.000 -0.028 -0.031 0.465 -0.101 GFCF 
     1.000 0.126 0.259 0.077 Internet 
      1.000 0.053 -0.158 Pop 
       1.000 0.104 Ecoglob 
        1.000 Industria 
          
          
Panel A:  With Instrumented Variables (Uniform sample:  1219)  
  
Remit (IV) BcBd(IV) Domcred(IV) Trade(IV) GFCF(IV) Internet(IV) Pop(IV) Ecoglob(IV) Industria  
1.000 -0.006 0.198 -0.014 -0.062 0.407 0.096 0.064 0.098 Remit(IV) 
 1.000 0.321 -0.079 -0.072 -0.195 -0.138 -0.194 0.022 BcBd(IV) 
  1.000 0.205 0.222 0.123 0.031 0.285 0.291 Domcred(IV) 
   1.000 0.568 0.052 -0.237 0.715 0.135 Trade(IV) 
    1.000 -0.034 -0.038 0.465 -0.082 GFCF(IV) 
     1.000 0.122 0.248 0.070 Internet(IV) 
      1.000 0.051 -0.161 Pop(IV) 
       1.000 0.099 Ecoglob(IV) 
        1.000 Industria 
          
IV: Instrumented value. Remit: Remittances. BcBd: Bank Credit to Bank Deposits. Domcred: Domestic credit to the private sector. GFCF: 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Pop: Population. Ecoglob: Economic Globalisation. Industria: Industralisation.   
